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Esteemed Rector Magnificus, 
dear colleagues, students, family, and friends, 
What do we talk about when we talk about private law? Let me give an example 
to illustrate this question. I take a case from the UK, but the problem is easily 
translatable to the Netherlands. Looking at legal cases outside our own borders, 
moreover, already gives a bit of a taster of what we will be talking about when we 
talk about European private law. 
One of the most prominent UK cases of recent years was the so-called Bank 
Charges case.1 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), at that time responsible for the 
supervision of banks’ compliance with consumer regulation, sought to challenge 
the costs that banks charged to their customers for making use of overdraft 
facilities. The system of overdraft charges in the UK is used as a form of cross-
subsidy by banks, with the income generated by these charges being used to 
cover the costs of other customers who never (or rarely) incur such charges. 
The question in private law, as identified by the UK Supreme Court, however 
is narrow—it focuses not on the system, but on whether bank charges should 
be considered unfair in the contractual relationship between the bank and the 
customer. In the words of Lord Walker:2
 Some would regard the United Kingdom system as being, in some sense at least,ob-
viously unfair, though Mr Sumption QC (for the banks) vigorously disputed Lord 
Mance’s suggestion that his clients were engaged in a sort of “reverse Robin Hood 
exercise”. That is an imponderable question which depends partly on whether one’s 
perception of the average customer who incurs unauthorised overdraft charges is 
that he is spendthrift and improvident, or that she is disadvantaged and finding it 
hard to make ends meet.  But it is not the question for the Court. The question for 
the Court is much more limited, and more technical. It is whether as a matter of 
law the fairness of bank charges levied on personal current account customers in 
respect of unauthorised overdrafts … can be challenged … as excessive in relation to 
the services supplied to the customers. 
 
1 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2008] EWHC 875 (Comm); [2009] EWCA Civ 116; [2009] 
2 WLR 1286; [2009] UKSC 6; [2009] 3 WLR 1215 (the Bank Charges case) discussed by Simon 
Whittaker (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 106.
2 Bank Charges case, Lord Walker, paras 2-3.
6  The Character of European Private Law
Weighing the arguments from both sides, the UK Supreme Court, overturning 
the decision of the Court of Appeal, held that the fairness of the charges could 
not be challenged under existing legislation. Terms concerning the price, which 
the Court deemed these charges to be, cannot be subjected to an unfairness 
assessment.3 The banks won.
3 The charges were deemed to fall within the exception in regulation 6(2)(b) of the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, as relating to ‘the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as 
against the goods or services supplied in exchange.’ They could therefore not be subject to a test of 
(un)fairness under the Regulations.
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This example is characteristic of what most lawyers would understand when we 
say ‘private law’,4 and more specifically contract law. It concerns the relationships 
between individuals or businesses or more generally, between private actors 
rather than public actors.5 The case illustrates which obligations those actors 
may have against one another under the contracts they concluded between them
—for example an obligation to pay a charge when making use of an overdraft 
facility—and the courts’ discussion of whether these obligations are enforceable 
under the existing rules of private law. Questions about ‘fairness’ are also very 
typical of private law relationships.
At the same time, however, the case veers away from what we would traditionally 
think of as ‘private law matters’ by having the court discuss possible restrictions 
on what private parties can agree between them. Legislation, or regulation, or 
statutory law—all synonyms for rules laid down by public institutions—in many 
cases interferes with private parties’ freedom of contract with an eye to achieving 
certain policy aims. Such a policy aim can be the protection of consumers in 
contract law, for example against unfair contract terms, because consumers are 
usually not in a position to bargain with regard to the terms of the contract. Not 
only do many businesses make use of standard terms and conditions—and does 
anyone ever try to re-negotiate them with a trader, let alone succeed?—they also 
are in a much stronger position because they can simply tell the consumer ‘if 
you don’t like my offer, too bad. You can take it or leave it.’
The pursuit of policy goals through law, sometimes labelled as ‘instrumental-
ism’,6 can provoke negative responses from lawyers who believe that private law 
should be concerned only with facilitating private law relationships, eg by mak-
ing contractual promises enforceable so that parties can go to court if the 
4 Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen identify seven characteristics; see ‘Private Law Beyond the State? 
Europeanization, Privatization, Globalization’ (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843, 847 
ff.
5 Although some blurring can occur between categories, eg where a public entity enters into a private 
transaction.
6 Although it gives rise to new questions in European private law, instrumentalism is not new in law 
and some of its darker sides have been subject to discussion in other contexts; see eg on US law Brian 
Tamanaha, The Perils of Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism (Wolf Legal Publishing, Oisterwijk 2008), 
arguing that ‘in situations of sharp disagreement over the social good, if law is perceived as an 
instrument, individuals and groups within society will endeavor to seize the law, and fill in, interpret, 
and apply the law, to serve their own ends.’
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other party does not perform their part of the agreement. Yet, policy goals are 
part and parcel of European private law. Legislation in this field, as I will discuss 
in more detail, is based on specific policy goals that the EU legislator seeks to 
pursue, such as the integration of the internal market but also social goals. Hans 
Micklitz analysis of what he calls ‘European regulatory private law’, which
represents a shift from autonomy to regulation in private law,7 is one way of 
describing that traditional distinctions between private and public in this field 
have become blurred.
Rather than avoiding the influence of instrumentalism on private law, the argu-
ment that I wish to posit is that we should actively seek to engage with it: how do 
policy goals shape private law in Europe? What does that mean for the substan-
tive rules of private law, for example in how contract law balances the rights and 
obligations of businesses and consumers? And seeing that rules are developed 
at ever more different levels of regulation—in national law, but also in EU law, 
transnational law and in self-regulation by businesses—how can we ensure that 
private parties are not subjected to four (or perhaps even more) conflicting sets 
of rules at the same time?
These questions, on a broader level, require us to re-think how we look at private 
law in a context of multilevel regulation. The puzzle in front of us is: if we accept 
that European private law is characterized by instrumentalism—give or take 
the objections that one may have against it, but accepting that this is factually 
what is happening—but also by the pursuit of different policy goals at different 
levels of regulation, how can we deal with the complexity that arises from it? 
Complexity here relates to the co-existence of rules at different levels of regula-
tion that can operate in parallel but that can also, depending on the context in 
which they operate, clash with one another. 
To explore this puzzle, I will focus on the law relating to consumer contracts 
in Europe, which is the main area in which the European legislator has active-
ly introduced legislation to facilitate contracting in the EU,8 but also to pursue 
7 Hans-W Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law – The Transformation of 
European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’ (2009) 28 
Yearbook of European Law 3.
8 See also Marco Loos, ‘The Influence of European Consumer Law on General Contract Law and the 
Need for Spontaneous Harmonisation’ (inaugural address University of Amsterdam, 2006).
The Character of European Private Law  11
policy goals—in particular the pursuit of a high level of consumer protection 
and the integration of the EU internal market. Some of this discussion may be 
of broader application in other areas of private law, such as tort law, and I will 
therefore on occasion use the broader term ‘private law’ even if the argument 
focuses primarily on contract.
The problem will be approached in three stages. The first part of this lecture will 
explore which policies the European legislator has sought to pursue in contract 
law, and for which reasons. The second part looks at what these choices have 
meant for the balancing of private law interests between businesses and con-
sumers in EU law. In that sense, it not only examines the character of European 
private law, but also its characters—for whom are private laws written? This part 
will show that the ‘Europeanness’ of private law at the EU level prompts a dif-
ferent balancing of interests between private parties—eg between businesses 
and consumers—than in national private laws, with the added complication that 
the balancing can also differ from one area of EU law to another. The third part 
focuses on how this multiplicity of rules across different levels or regulation, 
and different sources of law can be coordinated.
12  The Character of European Private Law
2
The Changing Character 
of Private Law: 
Local to European
The Character of European Private Law  13
Why does the European legislator create new rules for consumer contract law? 
Roy Goode—emeritus professor at Oxford and an early mentor on my academic 
path—used an illustrative example in his inaugural lecture at Utrecht University 
in 2003, discussing the argument that harmonization of laws is needed because 
‘consumers avoid buying in another state just because of the fact that they do 
not know the law’.9 This argument, focusing on consumer confidence, has often 
been used by the European Commission to justify harmonizing legislation. Yet, 
Goode replies:
 This conjures up a vision of a woman from, say, Ruritania, who visits Rome 
and there, in the Via Condotti, sees a fabulous dress, a dress to die for. She is 
about to buy it but then caution prevails: I must not buy this dress because I 
am not familiar with Italian law. Clearly a very sophisticated consumer, and 
one who by inference is familiar with Ruritanian law.
The argument that consumers refrain from cross-border purchases because they 
are unfamiliar with the law of the other state, indeed, seems weak. That does not 
mean, however, that there are no other reasons for wanting to improve the regu-
lation of private law transactions in Europe.
a. Economic and social arguments for regulation
Scholars in European private law have sought to establish whether theoretical 
justifications exist that can support legislative action at the EU level. Mostly 
these types of argument focus on market regulation, but economic arguments 
have been supplemented with broader arguments relating to social justice. 
Economic arguments relating to cross-border contracting in Europe focus on 
transaction costs.10 Additional costs can arise for businesses in cross-border 
contracts, for example because they will have to obtain legal advice about foreign 
law. To tackle this problem, legislative reforms aim at simplifying the regulatory 
framework for cross-border transactions, which should increase legal certainty 
and in effect also decrease transaction costs.
9 Roy Goode, ‘Contract and Commercial Law: The Logic and Limits of Harmonisation’, vol 7.4 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (November 2003); available at: http://www.ejcl.org/74/art74-1.
html.
10 See eg Fernando Gomez, ‘The Harmonization of Contract Law through European Rules: A Law and 
Economics Perspective’, InDret 2/2008; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371515.
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The ‘certainty’ argument is perhaps most commonly raised in commercial set-
tings, where contracting parties aim to make a profit, and utilitarian arguments 
carry more weight than concerns about the substance of the applicable rules. To 
cite a famous English case:
 in all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty. And   
 therefore it is of more consequence that a rule should be certain than   
 whether the rule is established one way or the other: because speculators  
 in trade then know which ground to go upon.11
Consumers and smaller businesses can too benefit from greater legal certainty. 
An argument that is often heard in the European private law debate is that small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may be deterred from entering foreign 
markets because they do not have the resources to obtain adequate legal advice 
and therefore run the risk eg of being confronted with stricter rules of consum-
er protection.12 For them harmonization of private laws or other strategies to 
facilitate the legal aspects of cross-border trade seem particularly useful. The 
economic argument also applies to consumers. By decreasing transaction costs 
and creating a basis for cross-border trade for businesses market gains will be 
established that will also benefit consumers.13 Another economic argument in 
favour of mandatory rules of consumer protection established at EU level is that 
such rules may decrease externalities.14
The project of facilitating private law transactions in Europe also has a social 
face. The aim of lawmaking projects in EU law should not only be to pursue the 
integration of the internal market but also, as legal scholars have pointed out, to 
achieve social justice.15 What kind of justice should be aimed for is a matter of 
11  cf Vallejo v. Wheeler  (1774) 1 Cowp 143, Lord Mansfield at 153.
12 Gerhard Wagner, ‘The Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law’ (2002) 39 Common 
Market Law Review 995, 1017-18.
13 ibid. Also, ‘Green Paper from the Commission on policy options for progress towards a European 
Contract Law for consumers and businesses’, COM(2010) def (1 July 2010) 9.
14 Filomena Chirico, ‘The Function of European Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’, in Pierre Larou-
che and Filomena Chirico (eds), Economic Analysis of the DCFR. The work of the Economic Impact Group 
within the CoPECL network of excellence (Sellier, Munich 2010) 9, 24-25.
15 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: 
A Manifesto’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 653; Hans-W Micklitz (ed), The Many Concepts of Social 
Justice in European Private Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2011).
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debate. Hans Micklitz has argued that the European legal order, because of its 
market orientation, has embraced a different type of justice than the redistrib-
utive justice found in national consumer laws. The aim of European legislation 
is to give enough rights to consumers to enable them to take part in the internal 
market and reap the benefits of it. The notion of justice associated with that 
philosophy can be called Zugangsgerechtigkeit or ‘access justice’.16 As a counter-
weight to the market integration ideology in EU consumer law policies, the idea 
of access justice can ensure that those for whom mandatory rules are written—
such as consumers—actually have access to the market so that they can benefit 
from these rules.
In pursuit of these economic and social goals, the EU has looked to the law as a 
tool for supporting the integration of the internal market.
b. Legal responses
Legal responses of the EU legislator have mostly taken two forms. On the one 
hand, the integration of the internal market has been pursued through the free 
movement provisions of the EU Treaty.17 These give power to the Court of Justice 
to find national legislation inconsistent with the free movement of goods—or 
services or persons or capital—if the national rules constitute an unjustified 
barrier to trade in the internal market. This type of harmonization, where inte-
gration of the market is pursued by removing barriers in national laws, is called 
‘negative harmonization’. Second, the EU has sought to support the integration 
of the internal market by introducing new legislation—this is called ‘positive 
harmonization’.18
The legal basis for harmonization is, in both cases, the removal of obstacles to 
trade in the internal market.19 In addition, the Treaty prescribes that harmoniz-
ing legislation should pursue a ‘high level of consumer protection’,20 whereas 
in free movement cases a justification for national measures that restrict trade 
16 Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law’, EUI Working Papers LAW 
2011/02, 21-23.
17 Case law has most often been based on the free movement of goods provisions; Artt 34-36 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
18 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn OUP, Oxford 2011) 601.
19 In case of positive harmonization, the EU’s competence to legislate in the area of European private 
law is based on Art 114 TFEU.
20 Artt 114(3) and 169(2) TFEU.
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may be that they are necessary for ‘the defence of the consumer’.21 The pursuit 
of a high level of consumer protection in EU policies is now recognized as a 
fundamental right in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.22 The legal basis 
for EU action, either through the free movement provisions or through positive 
harmonization, has a double aim: the integration of the internal market and the 
pursuit of a high level of consumer protection. These aims coincide with the eco-
nomic and social goals discussed in the previous section.
Now, can we in fact find ‘obstacles to trade’ in the European market, or a likeli-
hood of them arising, that justify the involvement of EU law in business-to-con-
sumer contracts? That is a question of measuring if, and in what type of cases, 
transaction costs deter businesses from offering their products in other Member 
States. Empirical studies indicate that traders who enter into distance contracts 
or consider doing so, in particular when this means offering their products to 
consumers in different countries, encounter significant hindrances. Over 40 per 
cent of traders indicate that factors that deter them from entering into cross-bor-
der sales are the potentially higher costs of the risk of fraud and non-payment, 
as well as the additional costs of compliance with different consumer protection 
rules or contract laws (including legal advice).23
The case for the EU legislator to facilitate cross-border private law transactions 
in the European internal market therefore seems to have merit. Both businesses 
and consumers can reap the economic benefits of an integrated internal market. 
From a social justice perspective the EU can stimulate the inclusion of weaker 
market participants in society. We therefore have a plot to the story of European 
private law. But in what way does EU legislative action in private law—either 
through harmonisation or through free movement regulation—affect the sub-
stance of national private laws? With that question, we move from the character 
of European private law to its characters.
21 ECJ 20 February 1979, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
(Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
22 Art 38 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – on which another Professor Mak may have more 
to say. 
23  ‘Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection’, Flash Eurobarometer 359 
(June 2013), 26-27, noting that 41% of traders list these two factors as obstacles.
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The question ‘who is private law concerned with?’ determines, in many cases, in 
what way private law operates in society. Generalized standards like the ‘reason-
able man’24 are used in many national private law systems to function as bench-
marks for assessing in which circumstances a private actor may be held liable 
for his actions, or to assess which expectations he may have had in contract if he 
has relied on statements in advertising. Judges tend to be quite colourful in their 
descriptions of what is essentially a fictional character that helps them define the 
expectations that a reasonable person may have, reflecting also that the concept 
is applied always in a particular time and place. From the ‘man on the Clapham 
omnibus’ in late 19th-century London,25 references in English law have broad-
ened to ‘any reasonable member of the public’, the ‘man on the jury’,26 the ‘man 
in the street’,27 and the ‘man on the Underground’.28 In a European context we 
encounter the ‘man on the Brussels tram’ or the ‘man on the Venetian gondo-
la’,29 and in Australia the ‘hypothetical person on a hypothetical Bondi tram’.30 
Even if the terminology is traditionally focused on men, these various bench-
marks apply equally to women.31
Standards such as these are used in private law to provide a reference point, 
often for judges but also for lawmakers, for the balancing of interests between 
parties. What may the ‘reasonable man’ expect from a contract, given the infor-
mation that the other party has provided?32 And in consumer law, when does 
advertising for an ‘average consumer’ cross the line from endorsing a product to 
misleading the consumer? The answer to such questions in individual cases 
24 cf Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781.
25 The phrase is attributed to Bowen LJ in McQuire v Western Morning News [1903] 2 KB 100 (CA), 
Collins MR at 109. See for a later use of the term Greer LJ in Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club [1933] 
1 KB 205 (CA).
26 McQuire v Western Morning News [1903] 2 KB 100 (CA) 109.
27 Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 (CA) 224.
28 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455, 495.
29 Nursaw v Dansk Jersey Eksport [2009] ILPr 263 (QB).
30 Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 156 CLR 7, 36.
31 To increase gender-neutrality in private law terminology, France recently removed the term ‘bon 
père de famille’ from its legislation, replacing it with ‘reasonable person’ terminology. On this 
amendment, Jan Smits, ‘Adieu bon père de famille’ (2014) Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en 
Registratie (WPNR), no 7012, 303.
32 cf Hans Nieuwenhuis, ‘Paternalisme, fraternalisme, egoïsme: een kleine catechismus van het 
contractenrecht’ (valedictory lecture University of Leiden, 2009); available at: https://openaccess.
leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/19705/afscheidsrede%20Nieuwenhuis.pdf?sequence=1.
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requires the legal standard to be substantiated, either through a normative 
assessment by the court—which is probably the most common in private law 
cases, leaving the judge to determine what is ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances 
of the case—or an empirical assessment based on opinion polls or surveys. The 
primary test will normally be a normative one, with empirical evidence only 
providing part of the factors that a judge will have to take into account in his or 
her decision. In comparison to other areas of law, surveys are more often used in 
trade mark cases, eg to establish distinctiveness or confusion, but their use is not 
ubiquitous amongst courts in the EU Member States. Germany has traditionally 
been more favourable to opinion polls or surveys than the United Kingdom.33
Since the normative question is relatively open-ended and sensitive to the con-
text in which questions arise, the assessment of reasonable expectations in 
contractual situations—coming back to our case study of business-to-consumer 
contracting in Europe—can lead to varied outcomes between Member States’ 
courts. To cite a common distinction in European contract law, notions of rea-
sonableness are more likely to supplement contractual provisions in continental 
European systems than in England.34 Different outcomes can also occur inter-
nally in a legal system, eg between courts within a Member State35 or between 
different areas of EU law. 
Whilst contract law through the use of open norms like ‘reasonableness’ or 
‘fairness’ is tailored towards achieving individual justice in individual cases, it 
also aims to ensure legal certainty, as we can recall from the previous section. 
The two aims can be in conflict, since greater variety between outcomes makes 
it harder for private parties to divine what the outcome might be if a court were 
asked to interpret their contract. This tension between open norms and legal 
33  The UK is still reluctant to admit survey evidence, although the context matters: acquired 
distinctiveness might sooner be empirically measurable than consumer confusion; see Graeme 
Dinwoodie and Dev Gangjee, ‘The Image of the Consumer in European Trade Mark Law’, in: Dorota 
Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill, The Image of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement 
and Competition Law (forthcoming 2015).
34 Martijn Hesselink, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’, in Arthur Hartkamp cs (eds), Towards a European 
Civil Code (4th revised and expanded edn, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2010) 619. Note 
Hesselink’s alternative view on good faith, 635 ff.
35 ibid. For an excellent discussion on Dutch judicial practices in ‘average consumer’ cases see 
Jan Kabel, Rechter en publieksopvattingen: feit, fictie of ervaring? (inaugural address University of 
Amsterdam, 2006).
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certainty may well be the evergreen of private law.36
The European dimension adds complexity to this puzzle. In business-to-
consumer contracts the standard by which the reasonable or presumed 
expectations of consumers are measured is that of the ‘average consumer’. The 
term is the official benchmark by which expectations are determined in free 
movement cases, trade mark law, and in unfair commercial practices law. It also 
can function as a benchmark to compare other areas of European consumer 
contract law, even if in regulation in that field often no specific reference is made 
to a particular image of the consumer.37 Problematic is that the images of the 
‘average consumer’ that have emerged in these two areas of European consumer 
contract law seem to set two completely different regulatory standards, based 
on very different rationales. Both relate to the policy objective to pursue the 
integration of the EU internal market. However, whereas the European Court in 
free movement cases pursues market integration by coming down on national 
consumer protection legislation that creates barriers to trade by adopting a high 
level of consumer protection in national law—a process helped by holding that 
consumers do not need that protection because they are well-informed and can 
take care of their own interests—the reasoning in harmonization projects works 
the other way. There, the EU seeks to pursue the integration of the internal 
market through legislative measures, and upholding the high standards of 
consumer protection adopted in that legislation confirms the place of EU law in 
national laws. Angus Johnston and Hannes Unberath have referred to this as the 
‘double headed approach’ of the European Court of Justice in consumer law.38 
The Court is Janus faced.
The puzzle that arises is how these conceptions of the reasonable expectations of 
an average consumer can be related to the balancing of business and consumer 
interests in national private laws, or even in self-regulation. Do we just have to 
accept that standards differ, or is coordination possible?
36 In the Netherlands, see Herman Schoordijk, ‘Zijn open normen in de wetgeving wenselijk?’, 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 1992, 1569; Maurits Barendrecht, Recht als model van rechtvaardigheid (Kluwer, 
Deventer 1992). See also Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in Law (OUP, Oxford 2000).
37 Apart perhaps, by inference, in the Consumer Rights Directive. Recital 34 refers almost verbatim to 
the specific provision made for vulnerable consumers in the UCP Directive.
38 Hannes Unberath and Angus Johnston, ‘The Double-Headed Approach of the ECJ Concerning 
Consumer Protection’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1237.
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Before coming to those questions, let me say a bit more about the ‘double head-
ed’ consumer benchmarks that have become prominent in EU law. Who are the 
characters of European private law?
a. The average consumer of EU law
The average consumer of EU law is defined as someone who is ‘reasonably 
well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’.39 In other words, we 
are looking at consumers who read the labels before placing a product in their 
shopping basket in the supermarket. Diligent and careful consumers, rather 
than ‘morons in a hurry’—a term that did have some popularity in trade mark 
cases in the UK and Canada.40
The idea of the reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect average 
consumer was developed in the case law of the European Court of Justice relat-
ing to the free movement of goods. It has since been copied in European rules 
relating to unfair commercial practices,41 and to retail investment services under 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).42 The Court intends it 
to function as a normative standard or guideline, which allows a national court 
to assess what the presumed expectations of an average consumer should be in 
the circumstances of a case referred to them. The Court at the same time leaves 
it open for national courts to make use of empirical data as part of their assess-
ment. Moreover, sometimes similar cases have used the criterion whether ‘a 
39  ECJ 16 July 1998, Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises 
Steinfurt [1998] ECR I-4657, ECLI:EU:C:1998:369, paras 30-31. An even higher level of circumspection 
is expected from the ‘informed consumer’ in relation to models in intellectual property law, as well 
as from the ‘man skilled in the art’ in patent law; cf CJEU 18 October 2012, joined cases C-101/11 P 
and 102/11 P Neuman v Buena Grupo SA, nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2012:641. See for a discussion of different 
consumer concepts in trade mark law Dinwoodie and Gangjee (n 33).
40  Morning Star Cooperative Society Ltd v Express Newspapers Ltd [1979] FSR 113, Foster J at 117; cited 
by Lord Denning MR in Newsweek Inc v Britisch Broadcasting Corporation [1979] RPC 441 (CA). For 
Canada, see CMS Industries Ltd v UAP Inc [2002] SKQB 303. The official benchmark in Canada is now 
the ‘ordinary hurried purchaser’; see Mattel Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc [2006] 1 SCR 772. Compare also 
Richard v Time Inc [2012] 1 SCR 265, in which the court defined the average consumer as someone 
‘who is credulous and inexperienced and takes no more than ordinary care to observe that which is 
staring him or her in the face upon first entering into contact with an entire advertisement.’
41  Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the inter-
nal market [2005] OJ L149/22, Art 5.
42 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments (MiFID) [2004] OJ L145/1.
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significant number of consumers’ would be misled as their benchmark.43 
The CJEU has more recently indicated that it regards this quantitative assess-
ment as a measure that may be interchangeable with the average consumer 
test.44 That finding appears to fit with some approaches seen in national sys-
tems, such as in German law, where the assessment of whether consumers will 
be misled is often tested through empirical studies.45 On occasion that may lead 
to contrasting outcomes between the EU test and the assessment in individual 
cases before national courts. For example, in the German Reinheitsgebot-case, 
national law prohibiting the import of beer that did not fulfil the German 
requirements for beverages to be qualified as ‘beer’ was held by the Court to con-
stitute a barrier to the free movement of goods. Justification was found in con-
sumer protection, notwithstanding the fact that German courts could assume 
the misleading character of advertising even ‘if only 10 to 15 per cent of the 
addressed average casual (passing) consumers would be misled’.46
Some flexibility for Member States’ courts exists because the European Court 
has indicated that ‘social, cultural and linguistic’ aspects which are particular to 
a Member State may be weighed in a national court’s assessment.47 The primary 
assessment, however, is the normative assessment based on the notion of a rea-
sonable, rational average consumer. 
b. The Calimero consumer in European consumer contract law
European consumer law has a second leg: the regulations and directives intro-
duced to harmonize the contracts laws of the Member States.48 In fact, the 
majority of legislative measures in contract law introduced with a view to pro-
43 See ECJ 16 January 1992, Case C–373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I–131, ECLI:EU:C:1992:17, para 15.
44  Compare ECJ 19 September 2006, Case C–356/04 Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co KG v Etablissementen 
Franz Colruyt NV [2006] ECR I–8501, ECLI:EU:C:2006:585, paras 78 and 82; and see ECJ Nissan (n 
43), paras 15–16, as well as the Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in that case, para 9.
45 See ECJ Gut Springenheide (n 39), para 36.
46 Roger Mann, ‘German Advertising Standards under Pressure from Europe’, (1999) 21 European 
Intellectual Property Review 519. ECJ 12 March 1987, Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 
1227, ECLI:EU:C:1987:126.
47  Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal 
market [2005] OJ L149/22, recital 18.
48 For an excellent overview and commentary on this body of regulation, honouring one of the main 
figures in European contract law harmonization, see Louise Gullifer and Stefan Vogenauer (eds), En-
glish and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law. Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2014).
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moting the integration of the internal market have focused on consumer law 
issues. Examples are Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
Directive 99/44 on the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, and 
Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights, each of an almost horizontal application 
across the field of consumer contract law.49 Besides that, a number of Directives 
and Regulations has been adopted to regulate specific markets, such as electric-
ity and gas,50 transportation,51 financial services,52 and (online) dispute resolu-
tion.53
In this regulatory field, consumer law appears to adopt a higher level of protec-
tion than in EU free movement law; an approach that befits a more naïve, rather 
than a rational, consumer. The rules laid down in EU consumer contract legisla-
tion not only seek to empower consumers—eg by imposing information duties 
on traders—but often also lay down substantive rights aimed at consumer pro-
tection, such as protection against unfair terms, remedies for non-conforming 
goods, or rights of withdrawal. In keeping with the principle of effectiveness in 
EU law, the Court of Justice of the EU has strengthened consumer protection by 
judging that the exercise of the unfair terms assessment should be supported by 
effective procedural mechanisms, in particular for the protection of weaker con-
sumers who may have been ignorant of their rights or unable to afford legal 
49 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ 
L95/29; Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees 
[1999] OJ L171/12; and Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64.
50 Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2009] OJ 
L211/55; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas [2009] 
OJ L211/94; and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency [2012] OJ L315/1.
51 Regulation (EC) 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to 
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights [2004] OJ L46/1; 
Regulation (EC) 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations [2007] OJ L315/14; Regulation 
(EU) 1177/2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by sea or inland waterway [2010] 
OJ L334/1; Regulation (EU) 181/2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport 
[2011] OJ L55/1.
52 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers [2008] OJ L133/66; and Directive 
2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property [2014] OJ 
L60/34. The Mortgage Credit Directive was adopted on 4 February 2014 and should be implemented 
by the Member States by 21 March 2016.
53 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes [2013] OJ L165/63; and 
Regulation (EU) 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes [2013] OJ L165/1.
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advice.54 Similar protection based on the notion that consumers as weaker par-
ties are in need of protection can be seen in cases in which the right of with-
drawal was extended if the trader had not informed the consumer that this right 
applied.55
A more fitting image of the average consumer for such cases would be the car-
toon character Calimero—created in Italy and famous in some other European 
countries too—who is a small, black chicken that gets into trouble often and 
does not quite understand why grown-ups around him are angry at him for his 
clumsiness. The phrase that he utters invariably at the end of each episode is: 
‘They are big and I is [sic] small and it’s not fair, oh no!’
Comparing unfair commercial practices and unfair terms regulation, it would 
therefore appear that the same ‘average consumer’ is expected to be more 
observant when reading adverts in the newspaper than when he or she agrees 
to (standard) contract terms. That would perhaps be justifiable if one considers 
that most consumers are unable to properly assess the effects of general terms 
and conditions before signing a contract because of cognitive limitations in pro-
cessing this type of, or amount of information.56 Lawmakers could perhaps also 
take into account that the majority of consumers does not, or only briefly, read 
the general terms before agreeing to conclude a contract. Research conducted by 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler in the US reveals that when concluding online soft-
ware contracts, most consumers either click on ‘agree’ immediately, or if they 
scroll down they never look at the page long enough to have actually read the 
information.57 But even if different policy reasons can be considered, is the 
54 ECJ 27 June 2000, joined cases C–240/98 to 244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano 
Quintero [2000] ECR I–4941, ECLI:EU:C:2000:346, para. 26.
55 eg ECJ 3 September 2009, Case C–489/07 Pia Messner v Firma Stefan Krüger [2009] ECR I–7315, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:502. And compare also the Schrottimmobilien cases: ECJ 13 December 2001, Case 
481/99 Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG [2001] ECR 
I–9945, ECLI:EU:C:2001:684; ECJ 25 October 2005, Case C–350/03 Elisabeth Schulte and Wolfgang 
Schulte v Deutsche Bausparkasse Badenia AG [2005] ECR I–9215, ECLI:EU:C:2005:637.
56For a critical perspective, see eg Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E Schneider, ‘The Failure of Manda-
ted Disclosure’, U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No 516, U of Michigan Law 
& Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No 10-008, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1567284.
57 Yanis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and David R Trossen, ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? 
Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 1.
26  The Character of European Private Law
divergence of consumer protection standards across different areas of EU law 
sustainable? The discussion has recently got a new impulse from the case law of 
the Court of Justice.
c. Janus faced or moving towards reconciliation? 
Recent case law from the CJEU suggests that the Court is seeking to take a more 
consistent approach to the application of the ‘average consumer’ standard in dif-
ferent fields of European consumer law. In its 2014 judgment in Kásler the Court 
for the first time adopts the average consumer concept of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive to give guidance on the assessment of unfair terms.58 The 
Court referred to the concept in relation to the transparency requirement laid 
down in Art 5 of the Unfair Terms Directive—which stipulates that terms must 
always ‘be drafted in plain, intelligible language’.59 In relation to the contractual 
term at issue in the main proceedings, which concerned a mortgage loan agree-
ment in a foreign currency, two assessments need to be made. Not only must it 
be assessed whether the ‘reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect’ consumer would be aware of the difference between the selling 
rate and the buying rate of exchange of foreign currency, generally observed on 
the securities market; it must also be determined whether the borrower would 
be able to assess the potentially significant economic consequences for him 
resulting from the use of the selling rate for calculating the repayments for 
which he would become liable.60 The standard, therefore, is that of the average 
consumer standard in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and similar 
to there, the court should examine whether the consumer was aware of the eco-
nomic consequences of the contract clause—and assume that, if he were, he 
might have made a different decision with regard to entering into the loan agree-
ment.
This judgment, interestingly, does exactly what the UK Supreme Court in the 
Bank Charges case refused to do: it regards the transparency of contract terms 
58  CJEU 10 April 2014, Case C-26/13 Kásler, nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282.
59 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ 
L95/29, Art 5.
60 CJEU Kásler (n 58) para 74. The outcome of the case is otherwise still unknown since, in accordance 
with established rules of EU law, it is for the national court to make this assessment, taking into 
account all relevant circumstances of the case; see ECJ 1 April 2004, Case C-237/02 Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I-3403, ECLI:EU:C:2004:209.
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through the eyes of the ‘average consumer’. The Court of Appeal in that case had 
held that whether charges should be regarded as part of the ‘price or remuner-
ation’ should be determined by the standard of a typical consumer, noting also 
that this would correspond with the average consumer standard in other areas of 
EU law (ie unfair commercial practices regulation).61 As we know, the Supreme 
Court held otherwise, namely that the charges according to an objective inter-
pretation by the court fell within the ‘price and remuneration’ exception. It looks 
like there may now be some room for consumers to bring new cases in the wake 
of Kásler, since core terms (like the price) can be subject to the fairness test if 
they are not drafted in plain and intelligible language,62 which should now be 
determined from the viewpoint of the average consumer. Nonetheless, the 
unfairness of contract terms will still have to be determined by the national 
court, taking account of the circumstances of the case—it is therefore not a 
given that bank charges will be found unfair. The outcome could moreover be 
different in other legal systems; the Netherlands for example adopts a very restric-
tive notion of ‘core terms’ and it is not unimaginable that the bank charges could 
have been challenged if a similar case came before a Dutch court.63 
As an aside, another route that is starting to be tested, also in the wake of a judg-
ment from the European Court of Justice, is to challenge bank charges on the 
ground that they are an adjustment of the price to which the consumer had not 
agreed. In accordance with the CJEU judgment in Invitel, such adjustments can 
be challenged as unfair terms if the bank does not give the consumer the pos-
sibility to terminate the contract.64 This may provide relief to many consumers, 
although it should also be noted that many banks had already voluntarily low-
ered their charges after the Bank Charges case was decided.
61 Following the lower court in adopting Simon Whittaker’s take on the question in Chitty on Contracts; 
see Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] EWCA Civ 116, para 91.
62 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ 
L95/29, Art 4(2).
63 For a recent discussion, highlighting also changes following from Directive 2011/83 on consumer 
rights, see Marco Loos, ‘Algemene voorwaarden onder de voorgestelde richtlijn consumentenrechten’, 
Vermogensrechtelijke Analyses, 2009, no 2, 58, 65-66.
64  See a recent County Court judgment in which a consumer successfully challenged overdraft 
charges with reference to CJEU 26 April 2012, Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v 
Invitel Távközlési Zrt, nyr, with the judge however indicating that the assessment could only relate to 
the case at hand and not be of general application. See Foster-Burnell v Lloyds TSB Bank plc (Taunton 
County Court 23 June 2014, DDJ Stockdale), para 51-52.
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It has also been suggested that the average consumer standard is creeping into 
the substantive test of unfairness in the Unfair Terms Directive,65 which the 
CJEU appears to be giving more specific content in recent cases like Aziz.66 
These developments are met with some suspicion by EU consumer law experts, 
who fear that the extension of the rational, well-informed consumer standard 
to other areas might lead to a lowering of protection in those contexts.67 Yet, a 
broader application of the standard can have advantages. An objective bench-
mark such as the average consumer can be favourable to the harmonization of 
private laws.68 Further, its application to specific cases may in some Member 
States result in higher levels of consumer protection.69 
Even if the case law shows the average consumer standard creeping into other 
areas of private law, the current state of the law is still one of complexity. This 
section has highlighted two main strands of EU consumer law which, driven by 
internal market policy, arrive at varying levels of consumer protection. Besides 
that we have a wide field of unharmonized national private laws, in which the 
balancing of fairness in business and consumer relations can take on many local 
colours.70 Is this divergence of standards the status quo that we have to (learn to) 
live with, or is it possible to conceive of more structured approaches to lawmaking 
in European private law? I set out a brief research agenda.
65 Charlotte Pavillon, ‘Wat maakt een beding oneerlijk? Het Hof wijst ons (eindelijk) de weg’, 
Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht, 2014-4, 163, 167.
66 CJEU 14 March 2013, Case C–415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d´Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i 
Manresa (Catalunyacaixa), nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2013:164. See also CJEU 16 January 2014, Case C–226/12 
Constructora Principado SA v José Ignacio Menéndez Álvarez, nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:10.
67 See Pavillon (n 65), 167; Joasia Luzak, ‘Online Disclosure Rules of the Consumer Rights Directive: 
Protecting Passive or Active Consumers?’ (2015) 4 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 
(forthcoming); Bram Duivenvoorde, The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (doctoral thesis University of Amsterdam, defended 3 July 2014) 222-224.
68  Pavillon, ibid. Similarly, Whittaker (n 1) 114-115.
69 Whittaker, for example, pleads in favour of identification of the ‘price and remuneration’ from the 
viewpoint of the typical or average consumer, rather than through an objective assessment by the (UK) 
courts. That could potentially bring a contract clause concerning charges outside the exception laid 
down in regulation 4(2) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, and therefore 
subject to an assessment of (un)fairness. Whittaker (n 1) 114.
70 Compare, in Dutch, Charlotte Pavillon, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht: de 
oneerlijkheidsnorm in vergelijkend perspectief (Kluwer, Deventer 2011).
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John Austin is supposed to have said, upon turning from the study of the 
English common law to the study of Roman law as taught in German universi-
ties of the 19th century, that it felt like escaping ‘from the empire of chaos and 
darkness, to a world that seems by comparison, the region of order and light’.71
From what came before, we may surmise that not many private law scholars will 
find ‘order and light’ in the current state of European private law. The increasing 
Europeanisation of private law puts pressure on positivist legal perspectives in 
which emerging problems need to be solved within the (foremost national) sys-
tem of private law. That can be problematic, because rules developed at the EU 
level—as we have seen—are often based on very different policy considerations 
than in national private law systems.72 National private laws have gradually 
developed over centuries and represent a system of rules and principles, but 
also of values and practices, within the boundaries of which lawyers are able to 
find solutions that fit with their conceptions of legal order, system, and justice.73 
Consumer protection—notably of a more recent nature in many private law 
systems, since regulation first appeared from the 1960s and 1970s onwards—
comes in different forms and degrees in the EU Member States. Then, in comes 
the ‘average consumer’ from EU law and seeks to harmonize legal solutions and 
consumer protection standards across the board.
It seems no surprise then that national lawmakers often struggle to consistently 
apply rules originating in EU law and rules of private law in their own legal sys-
tems. The average consumer that we saw in the Kásler case is well-informed and 
rational, and potentially able to understand the fine print of a complex financial 
transaction. The Dexia saga in the Netherlands shows that the reality can be dif-
ferent—and also that courts find alternative routes in Dutch private law to 
71  John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined: Being the First Part of a Series of Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law (1832) (2nd edn, 1861), xciv. As cited by Stefan Vogenauer, 
‘An Empire of Light? II: Learning and Lawmaking in Germany Today’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 627, 627.
72 The policy choices and values of different legal systems in Europe differ significantly amongst 
themselves, which also raises questions as to whether harmonization is desirable at all; see eg Ewan 
McKendrick, ‘Traditional Concepts and Contemporary Values’ (2002) 10 European Review of Private 
Law 95.
73 cf Martijn Hesselink, ‘How Many Systems of Private Law are there in Europe?’, in Leone Niglia (ed),
Pluralism and European Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013) 199, 201-204.
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protect consumers who were more naïve than the average consumer of EU law.74 
Another problem—not limited to Europe—is that a growing part of consumer 
transactions are conducted in environments regulated by private regulation, and 
therefore largely outside the reach of formal private law. One can think of eBay, 
or its spin-off company PayPal. Each offers a global platform through which 
buyers and sellers can connect. Disputes can be resolved through the platform’s 
own dispute resolution mechanisms, and according to the rules written up by 
the operators of the platform.75 Even if, theoretically, a consumer could opt for 
litigation in a domestic court, the likelihood of that is slim, seeing that the costs 
at stake in consumer contracts are usually too low to justify that, plus that such a 
procedure would undoubtedly take much longer to complete than arbitration or 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution through eBay or PayPal.
The question is whether we—and by we, I address primarily legal scholarship, 
who may nonetheless inspire lawmakers and courts in this matter—can provide 
better strategies for coping with the complexities of lawmaking at different levels 
of regulation. In doing so, we should bear in mind the two aims of European pri-
vate law’s market integration and access justice policies: to ensure legal certainty 
and to pursue a high level of consumer protection.
The answer may lie in connecting that what makes private law strong—system
—with current debates in transnational private regulation. The transnational 
perspective, as taken by scholars like Calliess and Zumbansen,76 promises to 
connect the debates that are now taking place at two separate levels: the level of 
74 The court held that the bank or investment firm, as the expert party, is obliged to take account of 
the interests of the consumer and to protect him against the risks associated with his lack of insight 
or his own rash decision-making. More specifically, this means that banks and investment firms are 
obliged to warn consumers about the specific risks of a product, to investigate the financial position of 
the client, and if the circumstances demand it even advise the client against purchase of the product. 
Dutch Supreme Court (HR) 5 June 2009, NJ 2012, 182, annotated by Jan Vranken (De Treek v Dexia), 
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2815. For a more detailed discussion and comparison with English and German 
law, see Vanessa Mak and Jurgen Braspenning, ‘Errare humanum est: Financial Literacy in European 
Consumer Credit Law’ (2012) 35 Journal of Consumer Policy 307, 312 ff.
75 Gralf-Peter Callies and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2010) 165.
76 ibid. See also Peer Zumbansen, ‘Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global 
Governance and Legal Pluralism’ (2011) Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy, Research 
Paper No. 21/2011; available at http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/59.
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national, positivist private law systems, where legal academia is often—some-
what irreverently put—the handmaiden of legal practice; and the level oftransna-
tional legal scholarship, which focuses on private law relationships ‘beyond the 
state’ or ‘in a postnational constellation’, and in which theoretical perspectives 
until now have had the upperhand.77 (I realize that some will find the distinc-
tion an overstatement, but even if one does not accept that this is, by and large, 
the right view for private law today, the distinction helps to identify in which 
respects national, positivist conceptions of private law may have limitations).
How to connect those two worlds? I put forward three propositions that aim to 
instigate discussion and research on these questions.
I.  Questions of multilevel regulation are best approached through a legal 
 pluralist lens. Legal pluralism provides an analytical framework that makes 
it possible to discuss substantive questions in private law in a framework 
that encompasses all relevant norms—local or European or global, formal 
or informal. That is the most promising theoretical lens that can help us 
understand a world where business and consumer relationships are increas-
ingly taking place in a cross-border context, and are governed by overlapping 
rules originating in national private laws, European or international laws, or 
in private regulation. In the example of eBay, we are even looking at a global 
marketplace that virtually operates beyond the state, through private regu-
lation and private dispute resolution.78 It is true that a pluralist perspective 
gives rise to questions of legitimacy of lawmaking, and that ways in which 
to ‘manage’ the coexistence of pluralist legal sources still need to be worked 
out—but why not take up the challenge?
II.  Private law is grounded in doctrinal law and this should remain a core part 
of scholarship in this field, also in the study of European private law. This 
statement may seem at odds with my plea for a transnational approach to 
European private law, but it is not. Doctrinal techniques are after all not 
limited to being applied to national private law systems. We also make 
77 Michaels and Jansen (n 4); and compare the University of Amsterdam’s project on ‘The Architecture 
of Postnational Rulemaking’, on which see: http://arils.uva.nl/research/research-platforms/content/
the-architecture-of-postnational-rulemaking/the-architecture-of-postnational-rulemaking.html.
78 The regulation of such global operations can also be approached through network theory; see Eric 
Tjong Tjin Tai, Over de grenzen van het privaatrecht (inaugural lecture Tilburg University, 2011).
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use of doctrine when we do comparative legal research. To understand the 
solutions adopted in the private law of another country, we need to have an 
understanding of the way in which that private law system is organized and 
operates. Also in the study of private law emanating from the EU legislator, 
we search for cross-references between directives and regulations,79 guiding 
principles,80 or common standards used in different areas of European pri-
vate law. The latter I have illustrated with the discussion of the images of the 
‘average consumer’ in EU law. The standard appears at different levels of reg-
ulation, but what level of consumer protection the average consumer receives 
is always a question embedded in the specific context in which it operates. 
(Which incidentally lends support to the idea of a legal pluralist framework, 
as opposed to a monist framework). 
III. European private law would benefit from more empirical research. In 
 seeking to balance the interests of businesses and consumers, private law is 
intimately connected with economic and social policies in society. In order to 
do justice to the interests of private actors, it is therefore necessary to keep a 
constant check on whether private law is responding to problems that these 
actors actually encounter. That is an empirical question. I have highlight-
ed studies that have been done in Europe, eg to determine whether law is 
considered an obstacle to cross-border trade for small businesses, but little 
empirical data is available to assess the need for regulation in broader areas 
of European private law. The EU itself has in recent years put its money on 
Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs), which is a step in the right direc-
tion, but the way in which these assessments are conducted could be much 
improved.81
It is time to conclude. How should we define the character of European private 
law?
79 Walter van Gerven, ‘The ECJ Case-Law as a Means of Unification of Private Law’, in Arthur 
Hartkamp cs (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (3rd edn Kluwer Law International, Alphen a/d Rijn 
2004) 101.
80 Norbert Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law (Intersentia, Antwerp 2014); Axel Metzger, Extra 
legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Europäischen Privatrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 
2009).
81 cf Esther van Schagen, ‘The Hidden Potential of Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) in the 
Private Law Acquis’ (2014) 22 European Review of Private Law 69.
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In this lecture I have put forward some thoughts, but I readily admit that they 
give rise to more questions. The instrumentalist nature of European private law 
blurs the lines between private and public—but that raises the question which 
parts of private law can actually be considered ‘private’. Perhaps the answer is 
that only global market places like eBay still put party autonomy first, moderat-
ed by rules developed through self-regulation. As a second point, I have noted 
that policy choices influence the balancing of interests between businesses and 
consumers, with different outcomes in national laws, EU law, and also in trans-
national law and self-regulation. That raises the question how the complexity of 
different outcomes resulting from different sources of law can be coordinated.
Many questions remain to be discussed and I look forward to engaging in 
debates with colleagues at home or abroad. Finally, we can also turn to our 
students in class—for example in the Global Law programme at Tilburg Law 
School—to discuss these same issues. After all, as many have said before, a great 
teacher is someone who can learn from his or her students.
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on the way that private law works. 
I thank my colleagues in the private law department for developing a new spirit for 
private law research in Tilburg, now under the new name Tilburg Institute for 
Private Law. I look forward to the challenge of being its first Director, and thank 
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you for your trust and support. In the department, I also thank the PhD candi-
dates, those that have done research under my supervision and those that are 
currently writing their theses. Yael, Zihan, Jurgen, Anne and Daniëlle—it is 
immensely rewarding to be a part of your projects. Thank you for creating such a 
lively and inspiring research environment.
In the Law School, I thank Pierre Larouche, with whom I have worked together to 
establish the Global Law bachelor programme. It has been a pleasure working with 
you, and to now see our first students graduate this year. To the students: congrat-
ulations, and may you have every success in your future, no doubt global, careers.
To my family and friends:
Thank you for always being here, wherever this world takes me. It means a lot to 
have such a strong home base to come back to.
When I chose a title for this lecture, I thought of my father, who listed Bordewijk’s 
novel Karakter amongst his favourite books. What stands out for me from the 
book’s story is the determination of the main character, a young man called 
Katadreuffe, to learn the law and to become a lawyer—in which he succeeds 
eventually. That part of the book is similar to my father’s story, who only became a 
lawyer later in life. His love of the law has been an inspiration for my own choice 
to embark on a legal career. I miss him.
To my mother—if anyone knows their consumer rights, it is you. Thank you for 
always being supportive.
My four siblings—Joost, Constant, Elaine and Chantal. As people in Brabant 
would say, it is very ‘gezellig’ to come from such a large family. Thank you for 
being here today. To my sisters, the other professors in the family, thank you for 
sharing the academic path with me.
Finally, Simon—thank you for making every day more beautiful than the one 
before. To quote the words of a fellow Canadian: ‘Seeing you, I want no other life.’ 
      
      Ik heb gezegd.
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Prof.dr. Vanessa Mak (1979) is a Professor of Private Law at Tilburg 
University. Her research focuses on the role of private law in the economic 
regulation of the European (consumer) market, with particular focus on 
consumer contract law, and credit and investment law.
Prior to her appointment in Tilburg, Vanessa held positions as a Lecturer in 
Law at Oriel College, Oxford and as a postdoctoral researcher at the Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg. Vanessa 
has law degrees from Erasmus University Rotterdam (LL.M 2001, cum laude) 
and from the University of Oxford (M.Jur 2002, with distinction; M.Phil 2003; 
D.Phil 2006), where she obtained her D.Phil on Performance-Oriented Remedies 
in European Sale of Goods Law (published with Hart Publishing, 2009). She is 
chief-editor of the Dutch Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht and a co-editor of the 
international Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (EuCML).
